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Dirty Little Secrets: Fracking Fluids, 
Dubious Trade Secrets, Confidential 
Contamination, and The Public Health 
Information Vacuum 
Elliot Fink* 
While the carbon energy industry has frequently claimed that 
hydraulic fracturing processes and ingredients are proprietary and 
protected by trade secret laws, their large scale and volume 
nationwide and the well-documented dangers that they pose to 
public health have brought fracking under scrutiny. When 
individuals have been adversely impacted in their own backyards, 
weak federal and state laws and regulation have generally left 
these impacted citizens with little to no recourse and part of this 
problem stems from questionable uses of privacy law, specifically 
dubious claims of trade secrecy. Focusing specifically on 
Pennsylvania as a model of insufficient state regulation and 
Halliburton as an example of a fracking company that has utilized 
privacy laws and principles at the expense of public health, this 
Note examines two possible solutions to place future limits on 
fracking trade secret/confidentiality agreement abuses. One 
possibility is for all states that permit fracking to follow in 
Montana’s recent footsteps and adopt a similarly robust state 
disclosure law that meaningfully requires substantiating trade 
secret status. Ultimately, however, the Montana regime is not 
proactive or beneficial enough to meaningfully protect public 
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my family including my fiancé Lindsay, my mother Ellen, my father Stuart, and my 
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health; therefore, the best solution is to incorporate the 
“precautionary principle”—a pre-protection guarantee that the 
trade secret is safe, as is currently used in Europe—into the 
definition of trade secrets under federal and state law. 
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  INTRODUCTION  
On August 22, 2011, Halliburton CEO Dave Lesar made 
industry-wide news when he dispatched a fellow company 
executive to take a sip of the company’s new Hydraulic Fracturing 
Fluid, CleanStim™, at a conference held by the Colorado Oil and 
Gas Association.1 The stunt was likely meant to imply that 
Halliburton’s “fracking” fluids are not harmful to humans. Indeed, 
it may actually be the case that CleanStim™ is safe, since that 
product is manufactured with ingredients sourced from the food 
industry and the executive reported no ill-effects.2  However, 
despite the fact that the CleanStim™ brochure specifically 
disclaims the product being edible,3 it seems apparent that 
Halliburton’s fracking chemicals are far from safe.4 
On June 28, 2014 in Monroe County, Ohio, a fire at one of 
Halliburton’s fracking sites caused trucks full of chemicals to 
explode which in turn resulted in thousands of gallons of those 
chemicals leaking into a tributary of the Ohio River.5 Yet, even 
after more than 70,000 fish died and known toxic pollutants had 
seeped into a drinking water source for millions of citizens, it took 
approximately five days for Halliburton and the well owner to 
provide the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and its 
state equivalent in Ohio with the basic identity of the compounds 
contained in the spilled chemicals.6 This problem was exacerbated 
by Ohio law, which allowed Halliburton to shield disclosure of any 
 
1 See Can You Drink Fracking Fluid? One Gas Exec Did, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 
22, 2011, 7:13 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/can-you-drink-fracking-fluid-one-
gas-exec-did/ [https://perma.cc/C4GG-3WUP]. 
2 See CleanStim™ Hydraulic Fracturing Fluid System, HALLIBURTON (2010), 
https://www.halliburton.com/content/dam/ps/public/pe/contents/Data_Sheets/web/H/H07
550.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS8A-L4CY]; see also ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 1. 
3 See HALLIBURTON, supra note 2. 
4 ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 1. 
5 See Mariah Blake, Halliburton Fracking Spill Mystery: What Chemicals Polluted an 
Ohio Waterway?, MOTHER JONES, (July 24, 2014, 2:28 PM), https://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/07/halliburton-ohio-river-spill-fracking/ 
[https://perma.cc/RZV2-GS37]. 
6 See Blake, supra note 5; see also Laura Arenschield, Halliburton delayed releasing 
details on fracking chemicals after Monroe County spill, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH (last 
updated July 21, 2014, 9:016 AM), https://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014
/07/21/details-on-chemicals-trickle-in-after-spill.html [https://perma.cc/Q6MQ-5D9S]. 
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ingredient considered proprietary or a trade secret with anybody, 
except first responders and the head of the Ohio oil and gas 
regulatory body in the case of an emergency such as this.7 In the 
aftermath of the spill, authorities responsible for local drinking 
water, as well as local residents, never even fully learned the 
identity of these secret “proprietary” chemicals despite the high 
probability that the water supply had been tainted by them.8 
The Monroe County incident in 2014 highlights the dangers of 
fracking and the serious health implications of currently inadequate 
federal and state regulations of the fluids involved in this practice, 
which is intensely used across large swaths of our country.9 Even 
after being involved in such a noteworthy incident of 
environmental degradation, companies like Halliburton are able to 
claim that their processes are entirely safe and pose minimal health 
threats10 because federal and state laws allow them to shield the 
identity of the chemicals used and confidential settlement 
agreements permit them to silence any landowners who are 
adversely affected.11 Moreover, given the essential absence of 
federal regulation and the severe instances of “regulatory capture” 
at many state level regulatory bodies, such as in Pennsylvania, 
examined infra, the extent of previous environmental damage is 
not even known.12 The result is a regulatory system where trade 
 
7 See Blake, supra note 5. 
8 See id. 
9 See Benjamin W. Cramer, What the Frack? How Weak Industrial Disclosure Rules 
Prevent Public Understanding of Chemical Practices and Toxic Politics, 25 S. CAL. 
INTERDIS. L.J. 67, 71 (2016). 
10 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, COMMENTS OF HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.  ON 
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY ADVISORY BOARD TASK FORCE DRAFT REPORT ON 
FRACFOCUS 2.0 at 13 (Mar. 25, 2014),  https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014
/04/f14/20140325_HESI_Comments_SEABReport_FracFocus2_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SL72-6HK8] 
11 See Jim Efstathiou Jr. & Mark Drajem, Drillers Silence Fracking Claims with 
Sealed Settlements, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-06/drillers-silence-fracking-claims-with-
sealed-settlements [https://perma.cc/GQ7M-4PY6]; cf. David S. Levine, Confidentiality 
Creep and Opportunistic Privacy, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 11, 15 (2017). 
12 See, e.g., Melissa A. Troutman, Sierra Shamer & Joshua B. Pribanic, Hidden Data 
Suggests Fracking Created Widespread, Systematic Impact in Pennsylvania, PUB. 
HERALD: INVISIBLE HAND PROJECT (Jan. 23, 2017), http://publicherald.org/hidden-data-
suggests-fracking-created-widespread-systemic-impact-in-pennsylvania/ 
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secret protection and confidentiality, two key information privacy 
tools, are being utilized in such a way as to impair the public’s 
right to know about the true extent of fracking’s potentially 
harmful health effects.13 This raises the question of when trade 
secret and other confidential business information, where secrecy 
is generally preserved for the sake of fair business competition and 
to incentivize innovation, must yield to a more paramount concern: 
the health of our bodies, our water, and our communities. 
Therefore, this Note examines the current tension between 
federal and state fracking regulations, the common industry 
practice of using trade secret protection and confidentiality 
agreements to silence affected parties, and the public’s ability to 
access critical information about potentially serious threats to 
public health in their own backyard or in the watershed that 
provides them drinking water. Specifically, this Note will briefly 
examine what hydraulic fracturing, better known as “fracking”, 
actually is, its history of use and why it has become so widespread 
in recent decades. Next, documented environmental concerns will 
be examined alongside current regulations at the federal and state 
level and trade secret law will be introduced. Following that, the 
Note discusses the extent to which fracking companies are using 
trade secrets in conjunction with confidentiality agreements to 
shield the public from learning about their chemical compounds 
despite scientifically acknowledged health concerns. The Note then 
examines whether or not fracking companies’ invocations of trade 
secrecy are valid and looks at the effectiveness of certain state laws 
before ultimately concluding that such invocations ultimately 
amount to “opportunistic privacy” by the industry. Finally, this 
Note concludes by investigating the pros and cons of two possible 
solutions: Montana’s recently passed disclosure law and Professor 
Julie Zink’s proposal to incorporate the “precautionary principle” 
 
[https://perma.cc/PHY5-S9G6]  [hereinafter Troutman et al., Public Herald Impact]; 
Melissa A. Troutman, Sierra Shamer & Joshua B. Pribanic, “To Hell With Us” – Records 
of Misconduct Found Inside Pa. Drinking Water Investigations, PUB. HERALD: INVISIBLE 
HAND PROJECT (Feb. 14, 2017), http://publicherald.org/to-hell-with-us-records-of-
misconduct-found-inside-pa-drinking-water-investigations/ [https://perma.cc/4L3G-
CXQ2] [hereinafter Troutman et al., Public Herald Misconduct]. 
13 See Julie E. Zink, When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far: Public Health and Safety 
Should Trump Corporate Profits, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1135, 1162 (2018). 
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into the definition of a trade secret.14 Ultimately, this Note 
concludes that Zink’s approach, coupled with identical changes to 
state law, is the preferable course of action. 
I. BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND EXTENT OF “FRACKING” IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 
A. What is Fracking? 
Hydraulic fracturing, known as “fracking,” is a method of 
drilling for oil and gas.15 In the initial drilling stage, it is exactly 
the same as what would happen in any normal oil or gas well: the 
wellbore16 is drilled and a concrete casing is placed around it so 
that the fracking process itself can begin.17 Once this is complete, 
the first “acid stage” involves injecting acid and water down the 
well bore to clear any cement debris from the earlier casing 
process and to open a conduit for the fracking fluids which will 
eventually be pumped down the well.18 Next, in the “pad” stage, 
massive volumes of water are mixed with proppants, usually sand, 
and specialized chemicals.19 The mixed fluids are subjected to 
extreme pressures as they are pumped into the oil and gas 
formation which breaks apart fractures in the rock.20 While 
approximately 99% of the solution pumped down is comprised of 
water and sand, the volumes used are so high that the process still 
involves thousands of gallons of chemical additives, even if those 
 
14 See S.B. 299, 65th Sess. (Mont. 2017) (enacted); see also Zink, supra note 13, at 
1177–80. 
15 See MarathonOilCorp., Animation of Hydraulic Fracturing (fracking), YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VY34PQUiwOQ [https://perma.cc
/DQ44-RBAV]. 
16 See Wellbore, COLLINS DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com
/us/dictionary/english/wellbore [https://perma.cc/547R-Q3MN] (A  wellbore is “a hole 
drilled in the ground in order to look for or extract natural resources such as oil or gas.”). 
17 See Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, 
http://fracfocus.org/hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process 
[https://perma.cc/T7HM-M5UC]. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
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chemicals make up less than 1% of the overall solution.21 In the 
subsequent phase of fracking, called the “prop sequence stage”, 
successive stages of water and proppant material are pumped into 
the well in order to hold the new fractures open so that oil or gas 
(depending on the formation) can flow out.22 This stage also 
utilizes “several hundred thousand gallons of water” laced with 
chemicals.23 Lastly, in the final “flushing’ stage”, more water is 
used to clear the well and remaining proppants.24 
This entire process is only to “frack” a specific portion of each 
well; after each is done, the section is then plugged and the entire 
process is repeated between four and twenty times on each section 
of the well.25 At the completion of the entire fracking process, each 
of the plugs are removed and a surge of pressurized fluid 
containing oil or gas, fracking chemical additives, and potentially 
radioactive compounds that were contained in the underground 
formation flow up the well in a process called “flowback”.26 Such 
flowback is typically treated and then either reused by the fracking 
company or disposed of through release to surface waters, storage 
in open ponds, or injection deep underground.27 As discussed infra, 
almost every aspect of this process poses some level of 
environmental concern. 
Furthermore, the actual fracking process used for each 
particular well varies based on unique characteristics of that rock 
 
21 See id.; see also Lauren Donovan, Killdeer Oil Spill Being Cleaned Up, Officials 
Investigate, BISMARCK TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2010), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-
regional/article_af6a8bd2-b712-11df-b4ff-001cc4c03286.html [https://perma.cc/M6JQ-
C2DZ] (describing a  2010 “blowout” that occurred in Kildeer, ND when Sanjel Corp. 
was conducting the fifth stage of a 19-stage “frack” with each stage “injecting 370,000 
gallons of water and gel chemicals at 8,000 pounds per square inch.”). 
22 See FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, supra note 17. 
23 Id. 
24 See Kellie Fisher, Communities in The Dark: The Use of State Sunshine Laws to 
Shed Light on the Fracking Industry, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 99, 103 (2015); see 
also MarathonOilCorp., supra note 15. 
25 See Fisher, supra note 24, at 103–04. 
26 See id. 
27 See Brie D. Sherwin, Chocolate, Coca-Cola, and Fracturing Fluid: A Story of 
Unfettered Secrecy, Toxicology, and the Resulting Public Health Implications of Natural 
Gas Development, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 593, 602 (2016); see also Fisher, supra note 24, at 
104. 
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formation and tends to differ even from well to well within the 
same formation.28 Because each zone of oil or gas is essentially 
unique, each well needs a fracking “design tailored to the 
particular conditions of the formation.”29 Thus, the fracking 
process overall typically remains constant, while a range of 
different chemical additives and sequences are adjusted to 
maximize energy recovery from the well.30 This complicated 
aspect of fracking has arguably made the process harder to pin 
down and regulate and has also complicated the process of 
disclosing the chemicals used in each well. 
B. Fracking’s History: Why It Is Used So Widely, and the Extent 
of Its Use 
While hydraulic fracturing is actually decades old, it has 
recently become a key tool for oil and gas extraction in essentially 
every setting. This is because the process not only increases the 
amount of oil and gas that can be extracted from “mature” wells 
that have already been pumping fossil fuels out for years, but also 
creates the opportunity to economize the extraction of energy from 
new, previously untapped “unconventional” settings, such as shale 
and tight gas and oil sands.31 The fracking process was originally 
developed for commercial use by Stanolind Oil (the forerunner of 
Amoco) in order to help extract additional oil from wells with 
 
28 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 37–38. 
29 FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, supra note 17. 
30 See id. 
31 See Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History of an 
Enduring Technology, J. PETROLEUM TECH. 27 (2010); see also MARY TIEMANN & ADAM 
VANN, CONG. RES. SERV., PUB. NO. R41760, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND SAFE 
DRINKING WATER ACT REGULATORY ISSUES 2–3 (2015) (defining “unconventional” 
settings as ones with “low permeability” which were previously not economical to 
produce without hydraulic fracturing); DUSTY HORWITT, KEYSTONE SECRETS: RECORDS 
SHOW WIDESPREAD USE OF SECRET FRACKING CHEMICALS IS A LOOMING RISK FOR 
DELAWARE RIVER BASIN, PA COMMUNITIES 7, P’SHIP FOR POLICY INTEGRITY (Sept. 11, 
2018),  https://www.pfpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/PASecretFracking
ChemicalsReportPFPI9.10.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/AKK2-QKDD] (defining 
“unconventional” oil and gas settings as “a well drilled into any formation (coal, 
sandstone, shale, or other material) in which natural gas or oil can be extracted in 
economic qualities only with hydraulic fracturing, often in combination with horizontal 
drilling.”) (emphasis in original). 
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declining productivity in the 1930s and 1940s.32 In 1949, 
Halliburton was given the exclusive patent to use this technology 
and drilled the first successful commercial well that same year.33 
However, fracking did not gain much attention until companies 
began using it in shale gas34 settings around 1998.35 Moreover, the 
true ‘explosion’ of fracking did not happen until 2008 when the 
Marcellus Shale, a huge reservoir of shale gas underlying 
Pennsylvania and its neighboring states, was targeted.36 
However, government support played a crucial role: shale gas 
production via fracking was only rendered profitable by millions of 
dollars of federal research and tax breaks.37 Without crucial 
breakthroughs that resulted from government research, such as 
horizontal drilling, the fracking “shale” boom would have never 
been possible.38 For instance, between 1978 and 1992, the U.S. 
Department of Energy (“DOE”) invested $137 million in its 
“Eastern Gas Shale Program” which showcased many of the 
hydraulic fracturing and advanced drilling techniques that are 
currently in use in shale gas fields today.39 Moreover, between the 
1970s and 1990s, the DOE funded crucial research and 
development through its National Energy Technology Lab 
program which resulted in breakthroughs such as directional 
 
32 See Montgomery & Smith, supra note 31, at 27. 
33 See id.; Fracturing Fluid Systems, HALLIBURTON (2013), 
https://www.halliburton.com/content/dam/ps/public/pe/contents/Data_Sheets/web/H/H05
667.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6EG-QT78]. 
34 See FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, supra note 17 (explaining that tight 
shale rock formations were a type of formation that geologists previously thought were 
impossible to produce before the onset of fracking). 
35 See David Bahnsen, An Anniversary of History Being Made: The Birth of Modern 
Fracking, FORBES (Aug. 8, 2018, 5:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidbahnsen1
/2018/08/08/an-anniversary-of-history-being-made/#c6b9a8d3b34f 
[https://perma.cc/S455-6TRG]. 
36 See Cramer, supra note 9, at 70. 
37 See Kevin Begos, Tax Breaks, U.S. Research Play Big Part in Success of Fracking, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 24, 2012, 11:29 AM), https://www.cleveland.com
/nation/index.ssf/2012/09/tax_breaks_us_research_play_bi.html [https://perma.cc/TGG8-
PGFA]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF OIL & NAT. GAS, UNCONVENTIONAL OIL 
AND GAS RESOURCES (July 2016). 
38 See Begos, supra note 37. 
39 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF OIL & NAT. GAS, supra note 37. 
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drilling and micro-seismic monitoring.40 A concrete example of 
this effect is the use of micro-seismic monitoring throughout the 
fracking process. This technology, originally developed to track 
Russian submarines during the Cold War, was repurposed for use 
in unconventional gas settings to closely track the fracking 
process.41 Furthermore, the initial joint ventures with private 
entities were heavily subsidized by the DOE and tax breaks have 
since continued to render the practice profitable.42 
Therefore, it is safe to say that government investment in 
research, development, and tax breaks, coupled with private sector 
innovation, led to fracking’s widespread use today which has 
ultimately had a profound impact on America’s energy 
independence by opening up huge sources of previously 
unavailable energy sitting right beneath our feet.43 Yet, although 
much of the research conducted by the government seems to be 
unrelated to chemicals used in the process, the robust role that the 
federal government played in creating today’s shale fracking boom 
somewhat undermines the notion that these processes are 
proprietary and potentially deserving of trade secret protection. For 
instance, an oilfield owner doesn’t simply hire Halliburton over 
one of its competitors because they utilize a particular fracking 
chemical; instead, they also do so because they want access to 
Halliburton’s range of non-chemical technologies, which include 
micro-seismic monitoring entirely derived from government 
research. This notion of government support also further 
undermines the current regulatory landscape for fracking, since the 
country is now essentially allowing a force it created through 
subsidies, research, and tax breaks to harm its environment and the 
health of its citizens. Given the strong incentives that the 
government provided to get the industry off on its feet, it is hardly 
unreasonable to argue that the government should be able to decide 
 
40 See id. 
41 See Begos, supra note 37. 
42 See id. Importantly, however, some of this DOE money also went into the creation 
of FRACFocus, the fracking chemical disclosure registry. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
OFF. OF OIL & NAT. GAS, supra note 37. 
43 See Bahnsen, supra note 35. 
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the proper “regulation point”, particularly in the trade secrets 
context. 
Yet, despite serious public health informational issues lingering 
below the surface, hydraulic fracturing has become almost 
ubiquitous in America. Industry experts estimate that between 60 
and 80% of all wells drilled in the United States will be fracked at 
some point, and a 2016 EPA report concluded that approximately 
275,000 wells were fracked between 2000 and 2013.44 
Furthermore, a recent study by the Partnership for Policy Integrity 
(“PFPI”) that focused on Pennsylvania concluded that secret 
fracking chemicals were injected into approximately 2,515 of the 
state’s wells between 2013 to 2017, which comprised 55% of the 
total; however, due to the state’s weak and under-enforced fracking 
regulations, discussed at length infra, PFPI also estimated that 
these numbers were likely vast under-estimates.45 
Pennsylvania is probably also the most controversial, and 
perhaps important place where fracking is happening on a 
widespread scale. This is because the Marcellus Shale underlying 
Pennsylvania is essentially the “epicenter” of the fracking “boom”, 
the Delaware River basin in the state’s northeastern corner feeds 
drinking water to the New York City metropolitan region, and 
investigators have discovered severe occurrences of “regulatory 
capture” there.46 Regulatory capture is a process under which the 
very regulators who are supposed to be protecting the public 
become beholden to the entities that they are supposed to regulate 
and thus the priorities of the regulated industry become paramount 
to those of the public at large.47 Recent reports have demonstrated 
how it has happened in fracking at the state level in 
Pennsylvania.48 
 
44 See FRACFOCUS CHEM DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, supra note 17; U.S. EPA, OFF. OF 
RES. & DEV., 600/R-16/236F,HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FOR OIL & GAS: IMPACTS FROM 
THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING WATER CYCLE ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES IN THE U. 
S. (2016).  
45 See HORWITT, supra note 31, at 4. 
46 See id. at 5; see also Cramer, supra note 9. 
47 Regulatory Capture – Definition and Meaning, MARKET BUSINESS NEWS (2019), 
https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/regulatory-capture-definition-
meaning/ [https://perma.cc/3H8G-4PHW]. 
48 See Troutman et al., Public Herald Impact, supra note 12. 
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A 2017 report by the Public Herald which examined 
complaints made to state regulators found that environmental 
damage in the state was both severe and widespread.49 That report 
highlighted how almost every single municipality in western and 
northern Pennsylvania (the main areas where fracking is happening 
in the state) had at least one complaint to state regulators.50 
However, the report also revealed that dozens of those same 
municipalities reported thirty or more complaints and some areas 
even reported over one hundred complaints.51 Significantly, the 
report also showed a chart which demonstrated a direct correlation 
between the number of wells drilled and the number of complaints 
filed with the state regulatory agency.52 Yet, both fracking 
companies and ‘captured’ state regulators like those in 
Pennsylvania continue to assert that hydraulic fracturing is 






49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. (depicting chart featured below). 
53 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 13. 
54 Originally published in Troutman et al., Public Herald Impact, supra note 12. 




C. Environmental Concerns and the Federal Regulatory Vacuum 
Although its minimally regulated, fracking poses a multitude of 
environmental threats to ground and surface water and these 
dangers are ultimately amplified by the current questionable use of 
privacy and trade secret law by the industry. The first concern 
stems from the fracking process itself, which can allow fracking 
fluids and gases that the process releases to seep into otherwise 
safe sources of groundwater.56 An EPA report stretching back to 
1987, long before the shale boom, found groundwater 
contamination as a result of nearby fracking operations in West 
Virginia.57 Furthermore, a 2011 study of Northeastern 
Pennsylvania found significant evidence of widespread methane 
 
55 Id.  
56 See Fisher, supra note 24, at 104. 
57 See U.S. EPA, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANAGEMENT OF WASTES FROM THE 
EXPLORATION, DEV., AND PROD. OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL 
ENERGY IV–22, vol. 1 (1987),  https://archive.epa.gov/epawaste/nonhaz/industrial/special
/web  /pdf/530sw88003a.pdf [https://perma.cc/42UZ-2363]. 
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contamination of drinking water.58 Although methane did naturally 
occur in 85% of the water wells in the region, the study found that 
concentrations of methane in groundwater were substantially 
higher—approximately seventeen times higher on average—in 
areas where unconventional natural gas extraction was 
happening.59 The study ultimately concluded that landowners 
should get independent water tests on their wells before any 
fracking begins.60 Lastly, especially in truly “unconventional” oil 
or gas settings such as the Marcellus Shale, a final concern about 
fracking is that most of the fluid remains underground.61 News 
reports have described interviews with fracking company officials 
and industry experts and concluded that generally less than 40% of 
the fluid used in a fracking operation is recovered, with 20% being 
typical.62 The remaining 60–80% is left underground in the same 
“tight” shale formations where it is injected and can continue to be 
a source of negative environmental impacts in the future. 
Numerous studies have also revealed two other concerns 
associated with fracking. As can happen with any type of oil or gas 
well, the concrete casing on the well can fail and fracking fluids 
can seep into adjacent groundwater or the drill itself could 
accidentally impact groundwater and similarly contaminate that 
reservoir.63 These possibilities have been confirmed by both 
 
58 See Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking 
Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8172 (2011). 
59 See id. at 8173. 
60 See id. at 8176. 
61 See Abrahm Lustgarten, In New Gas Wells, More Drilling Chemicals Remain 
Underground, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2009, 8:12 AM), https://www.propublica.org
/article/new-gas-wells-leave-more-chemicals-in-ground-hydraulic-fracturing 
[https://perma.cc/CB29-MYPK]. 
62 See id. For instance, one report estimated that for each well drilled in the Marcellus 
shale, over “3 million gallons of chemically tainted wastewater could be left in the 
ground forever” and that, even if the chemicals make up less than 1% of that fluid, the 
chemicals alone still comprise “34,000 gallons” for each well; see also Barry 
Stevens, The Facts about Fracking Fluid and its Disposal, OILPRICE.COM (May 23, 2012, 
10:12 PM), https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Facts-about-Fracking-Fluid-
and-its-Disposal.html [https://perma.cc/BJE4-LP8F]. 
63 See Wendy Koch, Study: Faulty Gas Wells, Not Fracking, Pollute Water, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014
/09/15/faulty-gas-well-pollute-water/15631955/ [https://perma.cc/L9RL-S9WH]. 
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independent studies in the Marcellus Shale and the 2016 EPA 
report on fracking.64 Furthermore, there is also a large risk that the 
chemicals themselves or the flow-back which results from fracking 
could be spilled either on the way to or from the drill site or when 
the fracking wastewater is disposed of in surface waters without 
being adequately treated.65 A salient example of how this is 
actually occurring comes from XTO Energy, a fracking company 
with a bad record of environmental stewardship. In 2013, the 
federal government fined XTO for negligent actions in 2010 that 
led to toxic waste continually flowing into the Susquehanna River 
for over two months; in fact, this was standard operating practice 
for XTO, who at that time had already received one hundred and 
seventy-nine safety violations for just twenty-five of the 
company’s wells in Pennsylvania, even though they operated many 
more in the state.66 XTO’s behavior, along with the 2014 
Halliburton spill in Monroe County, OH, make it clear that these 
environmental harms are much more reality than speculation.67 
Moreover, recent 2018 SEC filings of key hydraulic fracturing 
companies confirm the continued prevalence of these issues. For 
instance, Range Resources felt the need to inform its investors of 
the material risk of “uncontrollable flows of oil, natural gas, or 
well fluids.”68 In the same vein, Noble Energy notified the public 
that “possible underground migration of hydrocarbons and 
 
64 See Thomas H. Darrah et al., Noble Gases Identify the Mechanisms of Fugitive Gas 
Contamination in Drinking-Water Wells Overlying the Marcellus and Barnett Shales, 
PNAS (2014), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/111/39/14076.full.pdf [https://perma.cc
/X2BF-AFBZ]; U.S. EPA, OFF. OF RES. & DEV., supra note 44. 
65 See Sherwin, supra note 27, at 602. 
66 See Susan Phillips, EPA Fines XTO Energy for Lycoming County Frack Water 
Spills, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 17, 2013, 5:54 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org
/pennsylvania/2013/07/18/epa-fines-xto-energy-for-lycoming-county-frack-water-spills/ 
[https://perma.cc/YA8D-K6RW]. XTO was further fined by the EPA in 2014 for Clean 
Water Act violations when it intentionally dumped material in wetlands and streams at 
eight West Virginia sites. Susan Phillips, Feds Fine Marcellus Driller XTO $2.3 Million, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 22, 2014, 6:35 PM) [hereinafter Phillips, Feds Fine Marcellus 
Driller], https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2014/12/22/feds-fine-marcellus-driller-
xto-2-3-million/ [https://perma.cc/BBK4-QKNA]. 
67 See Phillips, Feds Fine Marcellus Driller, supra note 66; see also Blake, supra note 
5. 
68 RANGE RESOURCES CORP., ANN. REP. (FORM 10-K) (2018), at 29. 
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chemicals” was a key ongoing concern for that business.69 
Furthermore, Halliburton apprised its investors that it faces a risk 
of “potential pre-injection spills or releases of stored fracturing 
fluids and potential spills or releases of fuel or other fluids.”70 Yet, 
despite classifying these concerns as material risks to their 
businesses, whenever these environmental issues actually occur, 
fracking companies use trade secrets, confidential settlements, and 
other forms of questionable privacy law to protect the true identity 
of the chemicals and toxins to which the public is being exposed.71 
Unfortunately, given the serious risks described above, both 
current federal and state regulations are inadequate. One of the 
fundamental underlying policies behind the idea of environmental 
protection in this country is that the public has a right to know 
certain things, such as basic health information about substances 
and compounds to which our citizens are being exposed.72 When 
regulations compel disclosure of such substances and health 
studies thereof, the public can actually better protect themselves by 
making an informed decision about whether or not they want to 
voluntarily expose themselves to such a risk or if they would even 
want to risk involuntary exposure.73 For fracking, this point is quite 
salient since ostensibly non-existent federal regulation has left a 
vacuum in which hydraulic fracturing companies have been able to 
operate using potentially harmful chemicals without allowing the 
public to study the potential health risks of such substances.74 
On the federal side specifically, the most important law from 
which fracking is exempted is the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(“SDWA”).75 However, the process is also generally exempt from 
the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the 
 
69 NOBLE ENERGY, INC., ANN. REP. (FORM 10-K) (2018), at 50. 
70 HALLIBURTON CO., ANN. REP. (FORM 10-K) (2018), at 4. 
71 See Sherwin, supra, note 27, at 633. 
72 See Melanie McCormick, Conflicting Theories at Play: Chemical Disclosure and 
Trade Secrets in the New Federal Fracking Regulation, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 
217, 223 (2016). 
73 See id. 
74 See generally Sherwin, supra note 27. 
75 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C (2012)). 
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Clean Water Act (“CWA”) as well.76 The SDWA is the most 
relevant federal law in this context because it was passed in 1974 
with the articulated goal of preventing degradation of groundwater 
drinking resources.77 Specifically, Part C of the SDWA governs 
underground injection and places rigorous reporting and permitting 
requirements on any entities falling within the Act’s definition.78 
However, from 1974 to 1997, the EPA interpreted Part C of the 
SDWA as inapplicable to fracking and only reversed its position 
after the Eleventh Circuit ruled in LEAF v. EPA that the Agency’s 
interpretation of the statute was unreasonable.79 Yet, in 2005, 
under the ‘Energy Policy Act’, the SDWA was amended again in 
order to specifically exempt fracking by changing the definition of 
“underground injection” so as to exclude “fluids or propping 
agents (other than diesel fuels).”80 Because that law was pushed 
forward by the Bush administration and its Vice President, Dick 
Cheney, who was Halliburton’s former CEO, the 2005 SDWA 
amendment has become known colloquially as the “Halliburton 
loophole.”81 
Although there were prominent pushes to enhance regulations 
on fracking during the Obama administration, almost none of those 
reforms were accomplished or had any meaningful impact.82 The 
 
76 See Fisher, supra note 24, at 107–08 (2015); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012) 
(showing section of CWA that has a carve out for its definition of “pollutant” that does 
not include something injected into a well to facilitate oil or gas production or for 
disposal purposes so long as the relevant state has determined no further regulations are 
necessary); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
6921(b)(2)(A) (2012) (showing that the RCRA was amended in 1980 to exempt flow-
back disposal from the law). 
77 See The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, §§ 121-126, 88 Stat. 
1660, 1674–80 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h to 300h–5 (2012)). 
78 See id. 
79 See 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997). 
80 Energy Policy Act of 2005, supra note 75. Interestingly, this exception mirrors the 
same “carve-out” as the one used to exempt fracking from the RCRA. See generally 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, supra note 76. 
81 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 24, at 106. 
82 See, e.g., Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 
1215, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to Senate Env’t and Pub. Works Comm.); H.R. 
2766, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to the Subcomm. On Energy and Env’t); 
Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 587, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (did not pass); Fracking Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC 
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most notable example is the 2015 BLM regulations promulgated 
by the U.S. Department of the Interior.83 They were finalized rules 
that would have regulated fracking similarly to the SDWA, except 
only on public and Indian lands; however, those regulations were 
enjoined from going into effect by the District court of Wyoming84 
and the Trump administration subsequently rescinded the rule.85 In 
fact, the reason the regulation was preliminarily struck down was 
that the federal court recognized that fracking was essentially 
exempt at the federal level and therefore, absent action by 
Congress, the practice’s regulation was left to the states.86 
D. State Level Regulations and the Use of Trade Secrets in 
Fracking 
The lack of federal environmental regulations makes state law 
even more important, not only because it is the chief method of 
holding fracking companies accountable, but also because trade 
secret law is principally a state matter. As exemplified by 
Pennsylvania, state regulations are typically too lax by giving too 
much trade secret protection; moreover, concerns abound that state 
regulators have clearly been “captured” by the industry. 
Halliburton summed up its view of the general regulatory 
landscape in its 2018 annual SEC report by saying that “legislation 
and/or regulations have been adopted in many states that 
require . . . disclosure regarding chemicals used in . . . [fracking] 
but that generally include protections for proprietary 
information.”87 However, based on new state laws like the one 
 
Act), S. 1135, 113th Cong. (2013) (did not pass); U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE MINORITY STAFF, CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING 1 (2011). 
83 See Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 
16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015); see also 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3–3 (rescinded). 
84 See generally Wyoming v. United States DOI, No. 2:15-CV-043-SWS, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 82132 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016). 
85 See Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, supra note 83; 
Rescission of a 2015 Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,464 (July 25, 2017) (to be codified at 43 
C.F.R. pt. 3160). 
86 See Wyoming, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82132 at *15. 
87 HALLIBURTON CO., supra note 70, at 10 (emphasis added). 
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recently passed in Montana, examined infra, there is hope that a 
solution to the trade secrets issue may be in sight.88 
Most states that do regulate fracking typically require some 
form of chemical disclosure in order to get a permit to drill a new 
well.89 A 2017 study on state level mandatory fracking fluid 
disclosure laws looked at the eighteen states where hydraulic 
fracturing is happening and being regulated and noted some basic 
differences between them.90 The study noted that about six of the 
states, including Pennsylvania, require the disclosures to be 
reported to the FRACFocus online database partially funded by the 
federal DOE, while other states like Wyoming and California 
require reporting directly to the regulatory body in charge of 
overseeing the practice.91 The rest of the states give the operator 
the choice of whether or not to report to FRACFocus or state 
regulators.92 What is required to be reported is generally the same 
information, however, and typically comprises the ingredient 
name, its Chemical Abstract Service (“CAS”) number (chemical 
identifier), the maximum concentration of the chemical in the 
fluid, and the supplier and trade name of the chemical, if 
applicable.93 
Most relevant here, all states currently let fracking companies 
designate their disclosure  as “trade secret” or “proprietary” when 
the company believes that the product is deserving of trade secret 
protection.94 After declaring the exemption from reporting these 
products, the companies generally must still include the 
concentration of the chemical used. However, they are able to 
shield its name and chemical identification number; in other words, 
the product’s underlying chemical ingredients.95 Some states also 
 
88 See S.B. 299, supra note 14. 
89 See Fisher, supra note 24, at 110. 
90 See generally T. Robert Fetter, Fracking, Toxics, and Disclosure, DUKE UNIV. 
ENERGY INITIATIVE (2017). 
91 See id. at 6–7. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. at 7. In addition to information about the chemicals used, fracking companies 
must also disclose the well location and name, the vertical depth drilled, the water 
volume utilized, and the applicable latitude and longitude. See id. 
94 See Fisher, supra note 24, at 110; see also HORWITT, supra note 31, at 7. 
95 See Fetter, supra note 90, at 7. 
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require operators to disclose the chemical family of the proprietary 
substance.96 The end result of these disclosure regimes allows the 
public to only learn about the overall concentrations of proprietary 
chemicals used without any valuable information about the 
chemicals themselves.97 
Other important differences among state laws influence the 
disclosure process. For instance, most states do not require 
disclosure until the well itself has been fracked, yet a few states, 
such as Texas, require disclosure as of the time that the permit to 
drill is issued.98 Furthermore, the states typically vary as to 
whether they require robust justifications for the trade secrets, 
whether or not such secrets can be exposed to doctors or first 
responders during emergencies, and other small differences.99 
The general inadequacies of these state regulatory regimes can 
be seen best in Pennsylvania’s current disclosure law and behavior 
of its regulators. For instance, although Pennsylvania requires 
reporting for the fracking process itself in unconventional settings 
like the Marcellus Shale, it does not require reporting or disclosure 
for the drilling process, for ‘conventional’ wells, or for chemical 
manufacturers.100 Moreover, as originally written, the 
Pennsylvania disclosure law included a “physician gag rule” that 
the state’s Supreme Court recently struck down, to be discussed 
infra.101 
Another issue at the state level is the chronic under-staffing of 
regulatory agencies.102 As the fracking “boom” accelerated 
hydraulic fracturing quicker than states could afford to hire 
additional well inspectors, in states like Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 8. 
99 See McCormick, supra note 72, at 230. 
100 See HORWITT, supra note 31, at 9–10 (emphasis added); see, e.g. 58 Pa.C.S. § 3203, 
Definitions, “Well operator.”; 58 Pa.C.S. § 3222.1(b)(1); 58 Pa.C.S. § 3222.1(b)(9); 58 
Pa.C.S. § 3222.1(d)(2)(ii). 
101 See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 356, 569–77 (Pa. 2016) 
102 Allison Grant, Drilling Inspectors Needed: Ohio looks to Hire as Shale Play 
Spreads to More Counties, THE PLAIN DEALER (May 10, 2012, 5:20 AM), https://
www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012/05/gas_drilling_inspectors_needed.html 
[https://perma.cc/4546-SKBQ]. 
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Oklahoma, and Texas between the years 2009 and 2012, it was 
commonplace for 60% or more of the wells to never be inspected 
due to staffing shortages.103 For instance, in Pennsylvania, the state 
maintained a staff of only eighty-four inspectors between 2009 and 
2012, yet over 60,000 wells were operated during each of those 
years; for that reason, regulators never inspected more than 35% of 
the wells in the state during any specific year in that time period.104 
Operating state regulatory agencies with such lean budgets 
essentially has created an environment where fracking companies 
police themselves. 
In addition to dealing with staffing issues, according to the 
2017 Public Herald report, the behavior of Pennsylvania’s 
regulators has been objectively pro-industry in shielding fracking 
companies from regulatory consequences.105 The report describes 
how Pennsylvania regulators kept complaints of drinking water 
contamination confidential and only released redacted versions 
when state “right to know” requests were lodged.106 The report 
found that since 2004, there were 4,108 water-related complaints, 
out of 9,442 overall complaints and 10,027 wells drilled in the 
state.107 However, despite the fact that the common thread uniting 
these complaints was that they were all located adjacent to 
unconventional shale fracking sites, Pennsylvania’s regulators 
concluded that only 6% of the water complaints were actually 
related to oil and gas.108 In the view of the Public Herald, the state 
agency responsible for handling these complaints “either broke the 
law or acted wrongfully or negligently in failing to properly 
investigate or enforce the law in 178” of these cases.109 These 
findings typify the weak state regulatory landscape for fracking. 
However, environmental laws are only one part of the problem; 
trade secret laws are the other. Although there is some relevant 




105 See Troutman et al., Public Herald Misconduct, supra note 12. 
106 See id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. (emphasis added). 
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principally a state law matter. At common law, misappropriation of 
trade secrets was a tort.110 Thus, the first Restatement of Torts 
listed six variables that factored into whether certain information, 
in the context of a misappropriation claim, constituted a trade 
secret111: 
(1) the extent to which the information is known 
outside the claimant’s business; 
(2) the extent to which it is known by 
employees and others involved in the business; 
(3) the extent of measures taken by the claimant 
to guard the secrecy of the information; 
(4) the value of the information to the business 
and its competitors; 
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by 
the business in developing the information; and, 
(6) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information can be properly acquired or 
duplicated by others. 
The standard still essentially weighs those same factors today, 
where most states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(“UTSA”), a model law created to harmonize state trade secrets 
law that has mostly succeeded in that goal.112 The UTSA defines a 
trade secret as “information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that” 
both “derives independent economic value” from not being known 
or “readily ascertainable by proper means” by others “who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use” and is “subject 
 
110 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939). 
111 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1939). 
112 See generally UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); 
James McQuade, Kayla Delgado, and Daniel Corbett, Massachusetts Enacts New 
Reforms on Noncompetes, Becomes 49th State to Enact UTSA, ORRICK (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2018/08/28/massachusetts-enacts-new-
reforms-on-noncompetes-becomes-49th-state-to-enact-utsa/#more-2559 
[https://perma.cc/8Y29-3WMK] (describing how as of publication, 49 out of 50 states 
had adopted the UTSA, with only New York holding out). For those who do successfully 
demonstrate an improper misappropriation, the UTSA makes either injunctive or 
monetary relief available. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2–3 (amended 1985), 14 
U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
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to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.”113 Under that 
incredibly broad definition, fracking fluids theoretically qualify for 
trade secret protection because they are formulas, kept confidential 
by chemical and fracking companies in order to maintain an edge 
over competitors, and have an independent economic value.114 
The two main relevant federal laws in the trade secret context 
are the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) and the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act (“DTSA”).115 Passed in 1996, the EEA was intended to 
be a federal bulwark against foreign trade secret appropriation, 
particularly via new tools like the internet.116 Unfortunately, the 
EEA was ineffective as there were very few prosecutions under 
it.117 Therefore, in 2016, Congress acted again and passed the 
DTSA, which was intended to strengthen federal trade secret 
protections further and was somewhat modeled off of the UTSA.118 
For our analysis, however, the most significant aspect of the DTSA 
is that it does not pre-empt state law, and therefore any solution to 
the public health vs. trade secrets dilemma that is solved by 
amending the DTSA (or EEA for that matter) will also need to 
involve amending state laws, such as the UTSA.119 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto, held that a property right exists in a trade secret, 
specifically in the holder’s right to exclude others from using that 
 
113 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4). 
114 See McCormick, supra note 72, at 222. 
115 See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–294, 110 Stat. 3488 
(1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (2012)); Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 
Pub. L. No. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376 (2012) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2016)). 
116 See Economic Espionage Act of 1996 § 1831(a)(1); see also David S. Levine & 
Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA At One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of 
Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 114–15 
(2018). 
117 See Levine & Seaman, supra note 116, at 114–15. Specifically, the DTSA was 
intended to fight against state-actor hacking entities like Russia and China and allowed 
trade secret owners to bring a civil action for trade secret misappropriation in Federal 
court. Id. at 115, 117. The more controversial aspects of the DTSA, areas where it 
significantly differs from the UTSA, are its ex parte seizure remedy and the fact that it 
only provides limited protection for whistleblowers. Id. at 119; see also Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2016, supra note 115. 
118 See generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016; see also Levine & Seaman, supra 
note 116, at 119. 
119 See Zink, supra note 13, at 1180. 
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trade secret.120 This case is an interesting parallel to the fracking 
fluid chemical disclosure debate. Regulating the use of pesticides, 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) 
authorized the EPA to use data from earlier applications for 
pesticides covered under the law in order to evaluate subsequent 
applications.121 In 1978, the law was amended to allow public 
disclosure of information used in FIFRA applications, even if they 
were considered trade secrets, if such data pertained to “health, 
safety, and environmental data . . . [and only if handed over] to 
qualified requesters.”122 Monsanto then sued and claimed that this 
public disclosure of its trade secrets in its FIFRA applications was 
a taking without just compensation in violation of the 5th 
Amendment.123 Although at the core of the holding is the idea that 
a trade secret comprises a property right, the Supreme Court also 
held that no taking occurred for the portion of data that Monsanto 
disclosed after the 1978 amendment because Monsanto was “aware 
of the conditions under which the data [was to be] submitted, and 
the conditions are rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest,” namely, ensuring that pesticides do not harm humans or 
the environment.124 Because Monsanto chose to risk disclosure in 
order to receive the benefit of being licensed under FIFRA, they 
lost this post-1978 takings claim.125 Therefore, Ruckelshaus retains 
importance in the fracking context. Theoretically a law requiring 
disclosure of health information about fracking fluids, similar to 
the amended FIFRA, could be passed and so long as it meets the 
limitations laid out above and so long as it concerns a licensing 
process to which companies could opt-in, it would not affect the 
fracking companies’ property rights in those proprietary 
chemicals.126 
 
120 See 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (holding that Monsanto was entitled to compensation 
for the government making its insecticide trade secrets public pursuant to a law passed by 
Congress that determined that it was beneficial to publish the trade secrets when deciding 
whether certain pesticides should be permitted). 
121 See id. at 992. 
122 Id. at 995–96. 
123 See id. at 998–99. 
124 Id. at 1007. 
125 See id. 
126 Cf. id. at 1007–08. 
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II. IMPROPER USES OF PRIVACY IN FRACKING 
A. Reported Water Contamination Incidents 
As mentioned, fracking companies like Halliburton commonly 
claim that the practice is entirely safe despite the fact that issues all 
over the country have abounded; therefore, this section will 
investigate some of the known incidents.127 To document the 
fracking contamination phenomenon, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (“NRDC”) created a database in 2014 which 
showed that up to that point that there were at least 36 cases of 
publicized groundwater contamination.128 One important incident 
dates back to the dawn of the fracking boom in 2008 in 
Colorado.129 One day that April, nurse Cathy Behr was working in 
the emergency room when a “gas patch” worker covered in a 
“sweet smelling” fracking chemical called ZetaFlow™ arrived for 
treatment after a “drilling accident.”130 Behr helped the worker 
remove his clothing and clean the chemicals off which resulted in 
her breathing them in.131 Next, Behr lost her sense of smell, her 
vision went blurry, and then her heart, liver, and respiratory 
systems went into a near-fatal failure.132 What makes this incident 
so egregious is what happened next: Weatherford, the producer of 
ZetaFlow®, refused to give the doctor treating Behr any 
information about the product, citing trade secrets.133 
The secret nature of these fracking chemicals effects harmed 
landowners in a myriad of ways. While the fracking boom has 
 
127 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 13. 
128 See Amy Mall, Incidents Where Hydraulic Fracturing Is a Suspected Cause of 
Drinking Water Contamination, NRDC: EXPERT BLOG (Feb. 28, 2014), 
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/amy-mall/incidents-where-hydraulic-fracturing-suspected-
cause-drinking-water-contamination [https://perma.cc/JV9Z-QG3Y]. 
129 See Susan Greene, Oil Secret Has Nasty Side Effect, DENV. POST (July 24, 2008, 
2:24 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2008/07/23/oil-secret-has-nasty-side-effect/ 
[https://perma.cc/JG4T-68FB]. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
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frequently been marketed as a means of economic self-
advancement for struggling rural areas, actual evidence shows that 
is not always the case.134 On this point, the 2009 story of George 
Zimmerman in Pennsylvania is notable.135 Part of Zimmerman’s 
story remains public because he sued Atlas Energy Inc., claiming 
that the company had poisoned his water and 480 acres of land 
with toxic chemicals.136 In order to make a legal case, water tests 
are essential, both before and after fracking has begun, but they are 
also very cost prohibitive; Zimmerman spent $15,000 on water 
tests alone.137 However, in Zimmerman’s case, the water tests 
showed direct evidence of groundwater contamination, since the 
water was polluted with seven known carcinogens after fracking 
began but original baseline tests showed that the water’s quality 
before fracking was “perfect.”138 Additionally, the oil and gas 
companies, as they commonly do, could not claim that the 
carcinogens were naturally occurring, since the contaminating 
substances found were artificial.139 
Though it was three years later in 2012, the story of the 
Leightons, also in Pennsylvania, mirrors the Zimmerman’s 
experience.140 In an arbitration filing that became public, the 
Leightons described how an addendum to their natural gas lease 
required Chesapeake Appalachia (and its agents Nomac and 
Schlumberger) to correct any harms to their water supply based on 
the fracking activities happening on their land.141 Like in the case 
of Zimmerman, water samples were done both before and after 
fracking and showed that negligent construction of the well had led 
contaminants to leak into adjacent groundwater for over a week; 
 
134 See John Craven, Fracking Secrets: The Limitations of Trade Secret Protection in 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 395, 399 (2014).  
135 See Jon Hurdle, Pennsylvania Lawsuit Says Drilling Polluted Water, REUTERS (Nov. 
9, 2009, 1:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fracking-suit/pennsylvania-
lawsuit-says-drilling-polluted-water-idUSTRE5A80PP20091109 
[https://perma.cc/9DBQ-6438]. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 Id. 
139 See id. 
140 Compare id. with Leighton v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 1:13-CV-2018, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167802 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2013). 
141 See Leighton, supra note 140, at 4. 
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after that, the water showed high levels of methane, smelled 
terrible, was no longer clear, and became flammable.142 Because 
most similarly effected landowners as Leighton and Zimmerman 
likely would not have had the capital to conduct water tests to 
actually prove contamination, these cases demonstrate how 
Pennsylvania’s inadequate state regulation have allowed the 
fracking companies to essentially “bully” affected landowners.143 
Without the proper scientific tools to prove contamination and with 
many of the pollutants hidden as trade secrets, it seems likely that 
the “captured” Pennsylvania regulators, whenever affected parties 
made complaints of contamination, simply found that there was no 
evidence of it and refused to take action.144 
The vast impact and effectiveness of fracking companies’ use 
of privacy and information law is perhaps best understood in the 
fact that no plaintiff has ever successfully proven or been awarded 
damages based on harms done by fracking.145 Thus far in the 
history of the U.S. legal system, only two plaintiffs have come 
close: one was in the Parr v. Aruba Petroleum case in Texas, 
where a jury found that the defendant’s fracking operations 
adjacent to the plaintiff’s land and residence justified a $3 million 
verdict for the plaintiff.146 Interestingly, the plaintiff’s claim was 
not for violation of a state environmental law or for some other 
scientifically-proven damage; instead, the plaintiff made its case 
based on intentional nuisance.147 In fact, the court found that all of 
the plaintiff’s other fracking-related claims could not be proven 
since there was not enough scientific evidence.148 This result is 
 
142 See id. AT 6.  
143 See Troutman et al., Public Herald Misconduct, supra note 12. 
144 See generally id. 
145 Cf. David Blackmon, Parr v. Aruba – The Fracking Case That Wasn’t, FORBES 
(June 3, 2014, 6:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidblackmon/2014/06/03/parr-
v-aruba-the-fracking-case-that-wasnt/ [https://perma.cc/EZ5U-GYVT]; see also Daniel 
M. Krainen & Mackenzie S. Schoonmaker, Dallas Jury Awards Nearly $3 Million in 
First U.S. Toxic Tort Verdict Related to Fracking, NAT’L LAW REVIEW (July 28, 2014), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dallas-jury-awards-nearly-3-million-first-us-toxic-
tort-verdict-related-to-fracking [https://perma.cc/L9AU-CSLT]. 
146 See Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc., No. CC-11-01650-E, 2014 WL 1996882 at 1–2 
(Tex. 2014). 
147 See id. 
148 See id. 
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exactly why fracking companies are so aggressive in preventing 
the public from learning anything about their toxic substances, so 
that plaintiffs affected by them have no case to make at trial. Even 
worse for the plaintiff in Parr, an appellate court recently 
overturned the jury award entirely on the basis that even the 
intentional nuisance claim lacked sufficient evidence to justify the 
large verdict.149 
The other plaintiffs who came close were a group of 
homeowners in Dimock, Pennsylvania in Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas 
Corp, who alleged that Cabot’s fracking operations poisoned their 
groundwater.150 The plaintiffs in Ely also made out their case of 
damages in nuisance, and a unanimous eight person jury in 
Scranton, Pennsylvania awarded the nine plaintiffs a $4.24M 
verdict.151 However, that jury finding was subsequently vacated by 
a federal magistrate judge, who said that there were severe 
“weaknesses” in the case including a lack of clear scientific 
evidence for the verdict.152 
B. Confidential Settlements: The Norm 
The alleged groundwater contamination in Dimock, 
Pennsylvania affected the entire town153 and the Ely plaintiffs 
began as a group of over forty residents.154 This number dwindled 
down to nine plaintiffs by the time of the trial because of a 
confidential settlement.155 A landmark article written in Bloomberg 
 
149 See Aruba Petroleum, Inc. v. Parr, No. 05-14-01285-CV, 2017 WL 462340 at 7 
(Tex. App. 2017). 
150 Civil No. 3:09-CV-2284 (M.D. Pa Mar. 31, 2017); see also Timothy Cama, Judge 
Overturns $4.2M Award in Alleged Fracking Pollution Case, THE HILL, (Mar. 31, 2017, 
4:56 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/326784-judge-overturns-424m-
award-in-alleged-fracking-pollution-case [https://perma.cc/M4QL-7TNJ]. 
151 Cama, supra note 150. 
152 See id. 
153 GASLAND (New Video Group 2010). 
154 Cama, supra note 150. 
155 Cama, supra note 150. It is likely that the public never learned about the resolution 
of the Zimmerman and Leighton cases, discussed supra, because the cases were settled, 
and in return for compensation for the environmental harms done to those plaintiffs, the 
companies demanded their post-settlement silence. Cf. Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra 
note 11; see also Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Ark.), Inc., No. 4:11-cv-00474-JLH 
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2013) (dismissal with prejudice upon out of court settlement).  
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broke open this aspect of the fracking story in 2013,156 and 
described how fracking companies, prompted either by a lawsuit 
being filed against them or a complaint lodged against them with a 
regulatory body, will commonly settle with those affected and 
frequently buy out their land as well.157 It should also be noted that 
using confidential settlements is not limited to the fracking context 
whatsoever; rather, it is a practice commonly used in various 
industries wherever there are risks of repeat litigation against the 
same party.158 
One reason that the companies demand silence in return for 
settlement is that by keeping the settlement amounts secret, the 
lawyers for these companies maintain an advantage over plaintiff’s 
attorneys, who are unaware what the “market rate” is for such a 
settlement and thus exploit this advantage to minimally pay for the 
environmental damage caused.159 However, the more prominent 
reason confidentiality is so important to fracking companies 
pertains to public relations. Fracking companies want to be able to 
appear as clean as possible to the regulatory bodies in charge of 
issuing the permits necessary to engage in fracking and therefore 
silencing landowners and community members who are affected 
allows them to maintain that appearance of cleanliness.160 From a 
public health standpoint, however, this practice is exceedingly 
problematic because it puts the individuals responsible for 
protecting public health, those same regulators, as well as scientists 
and researchers, in an inferior informational position.161 
An interesting Pennsylvania case which did eventually become 
public is Hallowich.162 Because the settlement there also involved 
 
156 See generally Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11. 
157 See id.; see also Kevin Begos, Some States Confirm Water Pollution from Oil, Gas 
Drilling, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 5, 2014, 11:21 AM), http://old.seattletimes.com
/html/businesstechnology/2022603080_apxgasdrillingwatercontamination.html 
[https://perma.cc/8CMG-3VUY] (describing hundreds of such regulatory complaints 
filed in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Texas, and West Virginia). 
158 See R. Kyle Alagood, Settlement Confidentiality: A “Fracking” Disaster for Public 
Health and Safety, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10459, 10460, 10464 (2015). 
159 See Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11. 
160 See Alagood, supra note 158, at 10460. 
161 See id. 
162 See Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11. 
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the affected family’s minor children, the court was required to sign 
off on it.163 Yet, even those court hearings and the results of them 
were initially maintained under court seal as confidential.164 
However, after environmental groups and newspapers challenged 
to have them unsealed, the court reversed years later and unsealed 
the order.165 The public thus learned that the Hallowich family, 
including its minor children, agreed to be paid $750,000 in return 
for their land and for never speaking about fracking or the 
Marcellus Shale again publicly.166 Their lawyer describes objecting 
to the silencing of the children but how he wasn’t in a realistic 
position to negotiate the terms since the deal was a “take it or leave 
it situation.”167 Furthermore, the Bloomberg article makes it clear 
that such “take it or leave it” confidential settlements are standard 
fracking industry practice.168 Overall, these stories paint a vivid  
picture of the lengths to which fracking companies will go to keep 
the identity of their products and the environmental and health 
damage that they cause secret, even if it hurts the public.169 
 
163 See id. 
164 See generally Tr. of In-Chambers Proceeding, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No. 
2010-3954 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 23, 2011). 
165 See generally Order Unsealing Records, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No. 2010-
3954 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 20, 2013). 
166 See Tr. of In-Chambers Proceeding at 5, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No. 2010-
3954 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 23, 2011). 
167 Id. at 10. 
168 See Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11. For instance, Aruba Petroleum in Texas 
settled and bought the land of the Ruggieros, just as Royal Dutch Shell did with the 
Richardsons in Pennsylvania. Id. Similarly, Chesapeake Energy bought out three separate 
families in Terry Township, Pennsylvania. Id. Moreover, the industry successfully 
silenced Laura Amos, a woman who was once an anti-fracking activist in Colorado. Id. 
After fracking began near Amos’s home, her water well exploded and she later got a rare 
form of cancer. Id. Scientific studies showed that rats developed this rare cancer after 
exposure to the toxic substance 2-BE, which Amos alleged was in her water well due to 
fracking company Encana’s negligence. Id. Yet, after entering into a confidentiality 
settlement with Encana, Amos was subpoenaed by the Colorado Oil and Gas commission 
to discuss the potential for new stronger fracking regulations; however, Encana 
threatened to sue Amos and void the settlement agreement if she spoke and this tactic 
worked to force her silence. Id. 
169 See generally Alagood, supra note 158. 
2019] DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS 1001 
 
C. Documented Adverse Health Effects in Pennsylvania: 
Three recent studies, dating to 2015 and 2017 and conducted in 
Pennsylvania, confirm the fears about fracking expressed by many 
environmental groups and activists: namely, that fracking is not 
healthy for humans or animals. The first study, centered on 
Washington County, PA, examined the health effects of 492 
residents who used ground-fed water wells. The study concluded 
that the residents who lived within a kilometer of an 
unconventional gas well reported adverse skin and upper 
respiratory symptoms more frequently than those who lived further 
away from natural gas wells.170 Another study that same year 
focused on 15,000 births in Southwestern Pennsylvania: the study 
concluded that the babies with the highest exposure to fracking 
were more frequently born with low birth weight or were small for 
their gestational age than those who had less exposure.171 Lastly, a 
2017 study of approximately 8,000 people living in Northern and 
Central Pennsylvania concluded that the individuals with the 
highest level of exposure to fracking reported a significantly higher 
frequency of fatigue, chronic nasal and sinus, and migraine 
symptoms than individuals with lower exposure.172 These three 
studies make clear at a minimum that the more heavily one is 
exposed to fracking, the greater chance there is for damage to 
one’s health. 
 
170 See Peter Rabinowitz et al., Proximity to Natural Gas Wells and Reported Health 
Status: Results of a Household Survey in Washington County, Pennsylvania, 123 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSPS. 1, 24 (2015), https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/1307732/ [https://perma.cc
/DXW6-WK66]. 
171 See Shaina L. Stacy, et al., Perinatal Outcomes and Unconventional Natural Gas 
Operations in Southwest Pennsylvania, PLOS ONE (2015). 
172 See Aaron W. Tustin, et al., Associations Between Unconventional Natural Gas 
Development and Nasal and Sinus, Migraine Headache, and Fatigue Symptoms in 
Pennsylvania, 125 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 2, 189 (2017). Moreover, other studies have 
generally confirmed these findings. See A New Fracking Landscape: Report On Recent 
Science Shows Overwhelming Evidence Of Harm, PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP. (Mar. 13, 
2018), https://www.psr.org/blog/2018/03/13/a-new-fracking-landscape-report-on-recent-
science-shows-overwhelming-evidence-of-harm/ [https://perma.cc/3EZV-ZDP5]. 
1002         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:971 
 
D. How Commonly Is Trade Secret Protection Invoked and Is It 
Genuine? 
The evidence available since many states began requiring 
disclosure of fracking chemicals seems to indicate that trade 
secrets are being claimed by the industry in giant frequencies to 
avoid meaningful disclosure. For instance, in Texas, after that state 
adopted a disclosure law, between April 2011 and December of 
2012, fracking companies claimed trade secret or proprietary 
protection 10,120 times in reporting related to 12,140 instances of 
fracking.173 An investigation by the Obama-era DOE in 2014 came 
to a similar conclusion: trade secrets were being invoked 84% of 
the time.174 As seen supra in the litigation context, these 
invocations of privacy protection have been incredibly powerful at 
shielding the public from any knowledge about these chemicals.175 
But the true extent of the problem was not known until the 
recent 2016 EPA report on the safety of fracking. That report 
concluded that although the agency had identified 1,606 chemicals 
in fracking fluid and wastewater, they only had useful health 
effects information for 173 of those chemicals!176 This alarming 
statistic illustrates the extent to which fracking companies have 
negated the public’s ability to understand these substances. The 
result is that after its chemicals seep into the Ohio river, 
Halliburton doesn’t ever have to disclose to local drinking water 
regulators what was in those chemicals, since even if the law 
required them to do so (which incidentally it did not), the 
regulators technically would not even know what chemicals to 
look for, since they have no knowledge about these highly secret 
 
173 See Jennifer Hiller, Frackers Avoid Fluid Disclosure Despite New Law, STATESMAN 
(Feb. 9, 2013), https://www.statesman.com/news/opinion/frackers-avoid-fluid-disclosure-
despite-new-law/FDGqPa4z3inJqonVaQCqnO/ [https://perma.cc/B7UG-XE8N]. 
174 See  U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., TASK FORCE REPORT 
ON FRACFOCUS 2.0, at 11 (2014); see also HORWITT, supra note 31, at 4 (concluding that 
between 2013 and 2017, 55% of wells in Pennsylvania had at least one secret fracking 
chemical used in it, but that this number likely is a vast underestimate due to large 
loopholes in reporting requirements). 
175 See supra Section II.A. 
176 U.S. EPA, OFF. OF RES. & DEV., supra note 44 (emphasis added). 
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compounds.177 Yet, Halliburton has continued to claim that their 
products are entirely safe.178 
In fact, in the context of protecting their trade secrets, 
Halliburton has even questionably equated its products to the 
formula for “Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper, KFC’s fried chicken, 
[and] Bush’s Baked Beans.”179 However, such a comparison is 
inapposite for two very important reasons. First of all, products 
like Coca-Cola, which happen to be comprised of certain trade 
secret formulas, are externally regulated to be safe for human 
consumption by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) while 
fracking ingredients receive no similar external federal safety 
regulations and are in fact EPA-exempt.180 Furthermore, in Coca-
Cola and similarly trade secret protected food products, the 
underlying ingredients and their concentrations are always 
disclosed right on the side of the container, while the same cannot 
be said for “proprietary” fracking fluids under most current state 
disclosure laws.181 Yet, Coca-Cola has been able to not only 
enhance safety by giving the public valuable information about the 
underlying ingredients its product contains, but also maintain trade 
secret status despite such disclosures for over 125 years.182 
Therefore, the argument that these fracking chemical additives 
are not valid trade secrets partially turns on whether or not reverse 
engineering is possible, since that is a crucial affirmative defense 
to trade secret misappropriation.183 In fact, the 2014 DOE panel 
suggested that reverse engineering is not possible unless there is 
some sort of foul play engaged in by the state regulatory body and 
that therefore a “systems approach” style of disclosure—saying 
what’s in each fracking fluid by reporting a list of overall 
chemicals and products used without saying which chemical is in 
each product—does not endanger fracking companies’ trade 
 
177 Cf. Blake, supra note 5. 
178 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 13. 
179 Cf. id. 
180 See Sherwin, supra note 27, at 621. 
181 Cf. id. at 644. 
182 See id. 
183 See supra Section I.D. 
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secrets.184 Scholars have concurred with this notion and said that 
“due to the complexity of the fluid components and the way that 
they are used, it is extremely difficult for another company to steal 
the product.”185 Moreover, toxicologists looking at the issue have 
called the systems-approach, which entails fully disclosing the 
underlying constituent chemicals in each fracking additive, an 
“ideal solution” to allowing the public to learn vital public health 
knowledge about these chemicals.186 
However, Halliburton has directly pushed back on this idea.187 
In its comments to a 2014 Obama DOE proposal to have the 
systems approach disclosure utilized on the updated version of the 
web database FRACFocus, Halliburton attached a sworn affidavit 
from Ron Hyden, an experienced chemical engineer in charge of 
creating new fracking products and processes for the company, 
attesting that Hyden could take the information disclosed from the 
proposed regime and could essentially reverse engineer another 
company’s fracking formula.188 According to Hyden, given the 
unique characteristics of each formation and well, companies like 
Halliburton had created “specific and specialized fracturing fluid 
systems . . . and new additives” in order to maximize energy 
production from a certain well based on lab testing, research, and 
accumulated industry experience.189 Hyden suggested that 
precisely what makes each fracking chemical additive valuable to 
companies is its underlying “mix of ingredients.”190 For this 
reason, if a competitor was able to see the full list of constituent 
chemicals for a proprietary additive, in conjunction with the other 
information about the type of well where it was being used, Hyden 
believed that the competitor would learn “valuable information 
about what makes the product effective” and would be able to test 
 
184 Cf. Sherwin, supra note 27, at 638; see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SEC’Y OF 
ENERGY ADVISORY BD., supra note 174, at 13. 
185 Sherwin, note 27, at 636 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SEC’Y OF ENERGY 
ADVISORY BD., supra note 174, at 13). 
186 Sherwin, supra note 27, at 636 (suggesting that disclosure of concentrations as well 
as underlying constituents would be the best approach) (emphasis added). 
187 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 17. 
188 See id. at 35. 
189 Id. at 37–38. 
190 Id. at 38. 
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the same mix of ingredients under numerous conditions, even 
without possessing the underlying product itself.191 In Hyden’s 
estimation, experienced fracking industry chemists could reverse 
engineer products based on a list of the underlying ingredients and 
swore in his testimony that he was able to do this for one of 
Halliburton’s competitors.192 
Yet, Hyden’s arguments weaken the overall case for trade 
secret protection because they seem to suggest that a reasonable 
disclosure regime (the systems approach) would lead to reverse 
engineering of these products by competitors. While Halliburton 
argues that it’s the style of disclosure that leads to the ability to 
reverse engineer, a key point that cannot be dismissed is the fact 
that neutral observers such as toxicologists have referred to the 
systems approach method of disclosure as the one that is best for 
public health.193 It is basically an identical style of disclosure as the 
one that Coca-Cola is subjected to, yet that product has easily 
maintained trade secret status.194 More to the point, the public 
drinks a lot of Coca-Cola not only because the FDA says that it’s 
safe, but also because they know the actual underlying ingredients 
are. Given the documented cases where these chemicals have 
gotten into folks’ groundwater, Halliburton is essentially asking 
landowners to trust that their products are safe and asserts that any 
disclosure regime that would result in meaningful public health 
information could cause reverse engineering.195 
At common law, one of the six factors controlling treatment of 
an idea or formula as a trade secret was “the ease or difficultly 
with which the information can be properly acquired or duplicated 
by others.”196 Any information which can easily be acquired or 
duplicated by others is not really a secret, and therefore is not 
deserving of trade secret status. Halliburton has argued that the 
products are safe and therefore a systems approach is not necessary 
 
191 Id. at 38, 40. 
192 See id. at 39–41. 
193 See Sherwin, supra note 27, at 635–36. 
194 See id. at 645. 
195 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10. 
196 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939) (emphasis added). 
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to protect the public.197 However, the fact remains that if the public 
needs a systems approach to ensure safety and if such an approach 
would lead to reverse engineering, then these products are not 
trade secrets.198 This point is edified by the fact that Halliburton 
would not be able to successfully make a prima facie case of trade 
secret misappropriation against one of their competitors who 
recreated one of their fracking products, since the affirmative 
defense of reverse engineering would control.199 Therefore, either 
way, Halliburton’s argument is defective. On the one hand, if they 
are so similar to Coca-Cola that they must be considered trade 
secrets, then disclosing the underlying compounds to demonstrate 
the safety of the product should not be problematic. On the other, if 
these basic disclosures to protect public health lead to reverse 
engineering, unlike it does for Coca-Cola, then these products are 
not valid trade secrets in the first place.200 At its core, Halliburton’s 
argument amounts to unconvincingly claiming trade secrecy as 
both a “shield” and a “sword.” 
This idea is further edified by general industry practices around 
fracking. Typically, oil companies hold the leases for the areas 
where fracking will occur and then the lease-holding companies 
hire “oilfield services” companies, such as Halliburton or 
Schlumberger, to actually frack the wells.201 In order for what each 
fracking company does to be proprietary, there has to be an actual 
difference between what they can offer their lease-holding 
customers on any specific well. Yet, documents leaked from a 
fracking job done in Florida at the Collier-Hogan Well indicate this 
is not always the case.202 While this incident shows that there is 
 
197 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
198 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., supra note 174, at 13. 
199 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939). 
200 See Sherwin, supra note 27, at 644. 
201 See Jesse Emspak, Fracking Can’t Happen Without These Companies, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/080814
/fracking-cant-happen-without-these-companies.asp [https://perma.cc/857U-FJA5]; see 
also HALLIBURTON CO., supra note 70, at 3. 
202 See June Fletcher, Documents Reveal Halliburton Fracking Proposal at Collier-
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authentic competition between fracking companies, it also 
somewhat disproves the notion that each company is offering 
something so “proprietary” and “unique” as to deserve trade secret 
protection.203 
Both Halliburton and Baker Hughes, another fracking 
company, made proposals for how they would frack the Collier-
Hogan well to its owner, the Dan A. Hughes company.204 These 
proposals were shockingly similar: both companies proposed 
injecting their frack fluid at the same “bottom hole pressure” and 
during the pad stage, each company proposed doing 7 separate 
frack stages, each with the following sequence of fluid used, in 
thousands of gallons: 5, 6, 7, 7, 3.5, 1.5.205 The only significant 
difference was the percentage of concentration that the companies 
wanted to use during the acid stage: Halliburton preferred a 15% 
HCL solution while Baker Hughes only wanted to use a 10% 
solution.206 Another difference was the product names used for 
each component of the fracking solution even though they 
presumptively did the exact same thing within the fracturing 
fluid.207 Eventually, Baker Hughes was hired to frack the well and 
did so before Florida’s regulatory agency revoked its permit and 
fined the well operator for disposing oil waste in the shallow 
portion of the well, which just so happened to be dangerously close 
to the drinking water supply for the city of Naples.208 
A closer look at the offerings of Halliburton itself further 
bolsters the notion that some of these chemicals are not authentic 
trade secrets. In 2011, Halliburton acquired Multi-Chem, which 
was the fourth largest oilfield chemical manufacturer at the time.209 
 
203 See id. 
204 See id. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 See Everything You Need to Know About the Collier-Hogan Well: Why Fracking 
and Fracking-Like Activities Should be Banned in Florida, CONSERVANCY OF SW. FLA. 
(2013) https://www.conservancy.org/file/15—-policy-main/oil-page-extras/Collier-
Hogan-well_final_03.01.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/72DQ-YWPY]. 
209 See Halliburton Announces Completion of Multi-Chem Acquisition, BUSINESSWIRE 
(Oct. 3, 2011, 3:22 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20111003006802
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Today, if you go to its website, it lists Multi-Chem’s chemicals as 
one of its fracking fluids and describe why it is supposedly 
superior to its competitors.210 For the company’s service-marked 
“FracProcess System” there are three varieties: basic, intermediate, 
and advanced, each one varying in price and degree of how 
“custom tailored” it is to the particular formation.211 This raises the 
question of just how ‘proprietary’ the basic version of the 
FracProcess System truly is, since if it is so un-extraordinary and 
generic as to be common knowledge, then it would not be a trade 
secret.212 Therefore, it is helpful to understand that on FRACFocus 
itself, there is actually a list of commonly used fracking chemicals 
and the purposes for which they are used, in a convenient chart.213 
For purposes of simplification, the portion of the chart dealing with 
chemicals that act as breakers, clay stabilizers, corrosion inhibitors, 












210 See Stimulation Chemical Services: Customized Oilfield Chemicals and Stimulation 
Treatments, HALLIBURTON (2018),  https://www.halliburton.com/content/dam
/ps/public/multichem/contents/Brochures/web/Stimulation-Brochure-H012913.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G6XA-JHX5] (claiming that it gives operators 150% more production 
from the same well if other ingredients are used). 
211 See id. 
212 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939). 
213 See Why Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS CHEM. DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, 
http://fracfocus.org/chemical-use/why-chemicals-are-used [https://perma.cc/A6GP-
XMFA]; see also What Chemicals Are Used, FRACFOCUS CHEM. DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, 
http://fracfocus.org/chemical-use/what-chemicals-are-used [https://perma.cc/683H-
3WSX]. 
214 What Chemicals Are Used, supra note 213. 




Chemical Name CAS Chemical Purpose Product Function 
Ammonium Persulfate 007727-54-0 Allows a delayed break down of the gel Breaker 
Sodium Chloride 007647-14-5 Product Stabilizer Breaker 
Magnesium Peroxide 014452-57-4 Allows a delayed break down the gel  Breaker 
Magnesium Oxide 001309-48-4 Allows a delayed break down the gel  Breaker 
Calcium Chloride 010043-52-4 Product Stabilizer Breaker 
Choline Chloride 000067-48-1 Prevents clays from swelling or shifting Clay Stabilizer 
Tetramethyl 
ammonium chloride 
000075-57-0 Prevents clays from swelling or shifting Clay Stabilizer 
Sodium Chloride 007647-14-5 Prevents clays from swelling or shifting Clay Stabilizer 
Isopropanol 000067-63-0 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing agent Corrosion Inhibitor 
Methanol 000067-56-1 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing agent Corrosion Inhibitor 
Formic Acid 000064-18-6 Prevents the corrosion of the pipe Corrosion Inhibitor 
Acetaldehyde 000075-07-0 Prevents the corrosion of the pipe Corrosion Inhibitor 
Polyacrylamide 009003-05-8 “Slicks” the water to minimize friction  Friction Reducer 
Petroleum Distillate 064741-85-1 Carrier fluid for polyacrylamide friction 
reducer 
Friction Reducer 
Hydrotreated Light  
Petroleum Distillate 
064742-47-8 Carrier fluid for polyacrylamide friction 
reducer 
Friction Reducer 
Methanol 000067-56-1 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing 
agent.   
Friction Reducer 
Ethylene Glycol 000107-21-1 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing 
agent.   
Friction Reducer 
Guar Gum 009000-30-0 Thickens the water in order to suspend the 
sand 
Gelling Agent 
Petroleum Distillate 064741-85-1 Carrier fluid for guar gum in liquid gels Gelling Agent 
Hydrotreated Light  
Petroleum Distillate 
064742-47-8 Carrier fluid for guar gum in liquid gels Gelling Agent 
Methanol 000067-56-1 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing 
agent.   
Gelling Agent 
Polysaccharide Blend 068130-15-4 Thickens the water in order to suspend the 
sand 
Gelling Agent 
Ethylene Glycol 000107-21-1 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing 
agent.   
Gelling Agent 
Lauryl Sulfate 000151-21-3 Used to prevent the formation of  
emulsions in the fracture fluid 
Non-Emulsifier 
Isopropanol 000067-63-0 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing 
agent.   
Non-Emulsifier 
Ethylene Glycol 000107-21-1 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing 
agent.   
Non-Emulsifier 
Lauryl Sulfate 000151-21-3 Used to increase the viscosity of the fracture 
fluid 
Surfactant 
Ethanol 000064-17-5 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing 
agent.   
Surfactant 
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Naphthalene 000091-20-3 Carrier fluid for the active surfactant 
ingredients 
Surfactant 
Methanol 000067-56-1 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing 
agent.   
Surfactant 
Isopropyl Alcohol 000067-63-0 Product stabilizer and / or winterizing 
agent.   
Surfactant 
2-Butoxyethanol 000111-76-2 Product stabilizer Surfactant 
If Halliburton’s “basic” FracProcess system only utilizes 
chemicals that are on the list above for the purposes that the chart 
sets out (in addition to the other types of chemicals a fracking fluid 
typically contains), then there is a strong argument that it should 
not be entitled to trade secret protection. Perhaps the most 
important common law factor to determine whether or not an idea 
is a trade secret is the extent to which the information is known 
outside the business of the party asserting trade secret 
protection.215 Under such a test, it seems probable that the basic 
formulation would not pass muster as a trade secret, not only 
because such information has been disclosed to the public,216 but 
also because it is fairly clear that the fracking companies are doing 
the same thing on identical wells but simply using different 
product names.217 
Additionally, some of Halliburton’s more environmentally 
friendly fracking products could perhaps be so effective and safe 
that there may be a Ruckelshaus-style argument that Congress 
should mandate them being made public so that they can become 
the new industry standard.218 Specifically, Halliburton created 
what it called its CleanSuite™ line of fracking chemicals and 
methods, which were first successfully utilized together on the 
same well in 2012.219 The most significant component of 
CleanSuite™ is the fracturing fluid CleanStim™, the same fluid, 
made of ingredients sourced from the food industry, that the 
 
215 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757–58 (AM. LAW. INST. 1939). 
216 See Why Chemicals Are Used, supra note 213. 
217 Cf. Fletcher, supra note 202; cf. also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 10, at 37–
41. 
218 Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984). 
219 See El Paso Corporation Completed First Natural Gas Well Using All Four 
CleanSuite™ Technologies, HALLIBURTON (2012), https://www.halliburton.com
/content/dam/ps/public/common/Case_Histories/H09138.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE89-
A4QB].  
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Halliburton executive drank at the 2011 conference described 
supra.220 
Anybody who believes fracking is dangerous to the 
environment should welcome the use of CleanStim™ rather than 
dirtier or unhealthier alternatives. However, the available evidence 
seems to indicate that CleanStim™ is not being used frequently 
whatsoever.221 In fact, in an interview given over four years after 
the fluid’s introduction, a Halliburton PR representative noted that 
the fluid has been used “hundreds” of times worldwide before 
conceding that “it’s not in wide use.”222 This begs the question as 
to whether Halliburton simply created CleanStim™ to feign 
environmental stewardship with no actual plans to use it. If that 
truly is the case, there is actually a very strong argument that 
Congress should pass a law, like FIFRA in Ruckelshaus, 
mandating the disclosure of beneficial trade secret information to 
the public, to increase the usage of clean fracking fluids like 
CleanStim™.223 In other words, perhaps CleanStim™, rather than 
being a non-genuine trade secret, is a trade secret so well-
conceived that public policy dictates sharing it with the rest of the 
country; if there was evidence that CleanStim™ could decrease 
incidences of groundwater contamination, it seems like this would 
be the wisest course of action. On the other hand, some other 
commentators have also suggested that CleanStim™ is not as clean 
as Halliburton has suggested, since it still must be used in 
conjunction with other harmful chemicals to accomplish the 
frack.224 
 
220 See HALLIBURTON, supra note 2; ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 1. 
221 Cf. Brandon Mercer, Environmentally-Friendly Savior Of Oil Fracking Industry 
Could Be . . .  Haliburton? New Fluids Made With Soy, Vegetables, KPIX CBS SF 





223 Cf. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002. 
224 See Halliburton Executive Drinks Fracking Fluid at Conference—A Magic Trick?, 
WTFRACK (Aug. 23, 2011), http://wtfrackorg.blogspot.com/2011/08/halliburton-
executive-drinks-fracking.html [https://perma.cc/UD5R-8G9N] (alleging that CleanStim 
must still be used in conjunction with dirty, known-to-be-hazardous products such as 
ClaySurf-EZ (a clay control device) and GasPerm 1000 (surfactant)). 
1012         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:971 
 
E. Taking Stock of Current Laws 
Given that designation of trade secret status to some of these 
fracking chemicals is questionable and that fracking company 
privacy abuses create a public health information vacuum, it is 
worthwhile to analyze which current state laws are and are not 
working. Most states that do require some form of disclosure, such 
as Pennsylvania and Montana, utilize the systems approach of 
disclosure.225 However, California has gone even further and 
required the concentrations and chemical constituents of all 
additives, whether trade secrets or not, to be disclosed.226 
Perhaps the biggest problem with many of the current state 
laws in this arena is that they allow trade secret protection of 
fracking fluid chemicals without requiring any real justification as 
to why that should be the case.227 In most states where fracking is 
happening, such as Pennsylvania, existing disclosure laws require 
zero substantiation of the claim of trade secrecy by the fracking 
company.228 However, a number of states including Colorado, 
Illinois, Nevada, and most recently Montana, have taken the lead 
in enacting disclosure laws that require their state regulatory body 
to substantiate the trade secret designation before shielding the 
public from the underlying information that would otherwise be 
disclosed if it was not a trade secret.229 
The Montana approach has been hailed by scholars and 
observers as a smart first step in fixing the ongoing trade secrets 
 
225 See 58 Pa.C.S. § 3222.1 (b)(2); see S.B. 299, 65th Sess. (Mont. 2017) (enacted). 
226 See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 3160(j) (West 2018). Furthermore, California also 
requires fracking companies to provide the full information to its state regulators, so that 
in the case of an emergency they always have it, and then allows the information 
published to the public at large to limit disclosure of the underlying chemical constituents 
of a particular additive. See id.; see also California’s Fracking Fluids: California’s 
Fracking Disclosure Law, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (Aug. 12, 2015), 
https://www.ewg.org/research/california-s-toxic-fracking-fluid-chemical-
recipe/california-s-fracking-disclosure-law [https://perma.cc/MWZ6-28BJ]. 
227 Levine, supra note 11, at 27. 
228 See e.g., 58 Pa.C.S. § 3222; T. Jackson, Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure 
Requirements, CTR. FOR AMERICAN & INT’L LAW, (2017) http://www.cailaw.org
/media/files/IEL/ConferenceMaterial/2017/energyip/tjackson-paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F898-JK8L]. 
229 See Jackson, supra note 228; see also S.B. 299, supra note 14. 
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issues with fracking fluids.230 On May 4th, 2017, Montana 
strengthened its fracking chemicals disclosure law by reasonably 
limiting companies’ ability to claim that the chemicals are trade 
secrets.231 The stated purpose of the legislation is to “provide a fair 
process for disclosure of fracturing fluids to facilitate transparency, 
while protecting valuable trade secrets.”232 Like many similar state 
laws, Montana’s new disclosure regime requires oil and gas 
companies to report the contents of their fracturing fluids to the 
state Board of Oil and Gas Conservation (“BOGC”) who in turn 
publishes the disclosures.233 As far as what must be disclosed, the 
law mandates the following information234: 
(1) the chemical compound and identifier for 
each constituent ingredient 
(2) any hazardous components, product names, 
and types of additives used; and 
(3) the proposed concentrations of these 
chemicals. 
In its quest to achieve a fair balance between necessary 
transparency and protecting trade secrets, the new law has some 
industry-friendly aspects. For instance, once disclosure occurs, the 
industry entity can request that BOGC withhold publishing that 
was disclosed for confidentiality or trade secret purposes.235 Once 
such a request is made, the BOGC determines whether a particular 
ingredient is deserving of confidentiality or not.236 Any request for 
confidentiality must explicitly explain why the chemical or 
concentration at issue237: 
 
 
230 See Levine, supra note 11, at 27; see also Tyler J. Hall, Full* Disclosure: A Middle 
Road in Fracking Fluid Law, ORRICK (Mar. 9, 2017), https://blogs.orrick.com/trade-
secrets-watch/2017/03/09/full-disclosure-a-middle-road-in-fracking-fluid-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/UM6S-FNC7]. 
231 See S.B. 299, 65th Sess. (Mont. 2017) (enacted). 
232 Id. 
233 See id. 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
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 Is not already public information 
 Is actually maintained as confidential within the 
company seeking to shield its disclosure 
 Whether any other regulatory entity (in other 
states) has determined that it is not entitled to be 
hidden from exposure to the public 
 Has an independent commercial value and to 
explain what that value is, and 
 Why a ‘systems approach format’ would not 
adequately protect proprietary interests. 
In the event that the BOGC determines that all of the relevant 
criteria for proprietary protection are met, then the five-step 
explanation that the law requires will be posted online in lieu of the 
actual disclosure.238 This is helpful and renders Montana’s 
statutory scheme far superior to other disclosure regimes, where 
companies simply post an exemption on the disclosure registry, 
because having the five-step explanation will, at a minimum, 
illuminate the public about why certain chemicals are valid trade 
secrets. This may even facilitate enhanced scientific research. 
Furthermore, an unredacted version of the disclosure is kept in 
the BOGC’s confidential files at all times.239 On top of this, the 
information justifying the proprietary nature of the 
chemicals/concentrations found to be deserving of protection from 
disclosure must be updated every three years to make sure that it 
has not been revealed from some other source and that proprietary 
status has been maintained.240 Moreover, if a regulated entity 
believes that the BOGC has made an erroneous determination in 
denying protection from disclosure, they have the opportunity, via 
judicial review, to appeal the BOGC’s determination before any 
disclosure is made.241 If the court agrees with the BOGC’s 
determination, then such information will be fully published on 
FRACfocus; otherwise, it will be shielded from public 
disclosure.242 
 
238 See id. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. 
242 See id. 
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The Montana law also has one final benefit for 
environmentalists. Under the new law, anything dumped into “state 
waters” is never entitled to any confidentiality or protection from 
disclosure.243 Montana defines “state waters” fairly broadly as a 
“body of water, irrigation system, or drainage system, either 
surface or underground.”244 Because “state waters” is defined so 
broadly in Montana, this means that the law operates as a 
secondary incentive to companies to demonstrate environmental 
stewardship, since any egregious dumping of chemicals into state 
waters means that polluting trade secrets will be published and 
potentially lose proprietary status via mandatory disclosure. 
However, the European Union (“EU”) is also taking strong 
steps to protect its citizens from potentially dangerous compounds 
like certain varieties of fracking fluids. In stark contrast to current 
U.S. law which only requires the submission of safety data if it is 
available, the EU requires “companies generally . . . to prove the 
safety of their chemicals before use.”245 Europe’s underlying 
chemical regulatory philosophy, the so-called ‘precautionary 
principle’, perhaps better termed the “better safe than sorry” 
concept, requires governments to essentially force corporations and 
other entities seeking trade secret protection to first prove that their 
products and processes are safe before gaining protection.246 Julie 
Zink has argued that such an approach should be adopted in 
America and recommended amending the DTSA to reflect that 
pro-public health policy.247 
Zink’s proposal specifically contemplates amending the DTSA 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1839 by adding an additional element to be satisfied 
 
243 See id. 
244 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-6-102-(19) (2017); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-
103-(34) (2017) (defining state waters as stated above and carving out a small exception 
for pools used to store pollutants and irrigation or land application disposal waters that do 
not return to state waters). 
245 Michael Hawthorn, Firemaster 550 the Latest Flame Retardant Allowed onto 
Market Without Thorough Study, CHI. TRIB. (May 10, 2012), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-met-flames-regulators-20120510-
story.html [https://perma.cc/PU4N-M2RB]. 
246 See Zink, supra note 13, at 1177. 
247 See id. 
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for something to be considered a trade secret under that law.248 The 
additional requirement could be tersely stated as a third subsection 
of that definition as “the information does not endanger public 
health.”249 Zink also recommends using third-party testing to 
determine whether or not a product is safe, which would maintain 
neutrality in the determination.250 
F. “Confidentiality Creep” Incidents and “Opportunistic 
Privacy” 
Professor David Levine has written extensively about modern 
trade secret abuses.251 According to Levine, companies like 
Halliburton have come to massively overuse trade secrets in such a 
fashion that it has completely precluded a discussion of whether or 
not the public’s interests are adequately protected through the 
awarding of certain trade secret protections.252 In particular, Levine 
contrasts trade secrets with its other intellectual property-based 
cousins such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks—all of which 
inherently have limits—while trade secrets are inherently 
unlimited by their nature.253 In contrast to all other forms of 
intellectual property, trade secrets can “last indefinitely and are 
difficult to limit, absent independent discovery . . . [, disclosure] or 
reverse engineering.”254 Levine describes the underlying rationale 
for trade secret protection, a so-called utilitarian “incentive to 
innovate”; however, when that rationale is dubious, or in some 
cases non-existent, and the public has an interest in access to that 
same information being suppressed by trade secret protection, none 
of the external limiting factors for trade secret protection—
independent discovery, disclosure, or reverse engineering—are 
adequate and thus lead to “informational blind-spots.”255 The fact 
that the public knows so little about many of the fracking fluids 
 
248 See id. at 1179–80. 
249 Id. 
250 See id. at 1177. 
251 See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public 
Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 176–77 (2007). 
252 See id. 
253 See Levine, supra note 11, at 20. 
254 Id. at 21. 
255 Id. 
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being widely used around the country is exactly the type of blind-
spot that Levine worries about. 
Other scholars have challenged the traditional justifications for 
trade secret protection. Historically, the policies favoring trade 
secret protection were to incentivize innovation, to increase 
investment in human capital, and to serve as a source of law that 
regulates commercial ethics.256 Weighed against those factors, the 
classical policies opposing trade secret protection are the fact that 
it harms competition, that it takes resources to maintain protected 
“secret” status, and that it ultimately harms employee mobility to 
move between companies.257 While considering how these policies 
impact the use of trade secrets in the fracking context, another 
claimed downside of trade secret protection seems incredibly 
revealing: namely, that trade secret protection engenders a 
particular type of innovation, one which fosters “development of 
information that is itself amendable to being kept secret.”258 Levine 
has argued that fracking chemical manufacturers fall precisely into 
this category, since it is those chemical companies who actually 
understand the health risks that their products pose to the public; 
yet the companies, out of fear of future liability, have basically 
zero incentive to be more transparent than they currently are, even 
if their products actually are safe.259 
Levine has also coined two terms, “confidentiality creep” and 
“opportunistic privacy”, which are helpful to understanding the 
fracking trade secrets debate.260 Levine describes confidentiality 
creep as “the quiet, under-scrutinized, amorphous expansion of the 
kinds of information deemed inappropriate for public 
consumption.”261 The most salient example of confidentiality creep 
in the fracking context, examined supra, is the common industry 
practice of entering into confidential settlements with adversely-
 
256 See John R. Thomas, The Role of Trade Secrets in Innovation Policy, 3  CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., (2014),  http://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41391.pdf [https://perma.cc
/P8CC-RHTC]. 
257 See id. at 4. 
258 Id. 
259 See Levine, supra note 11, at 27–28. 
260 See id. at 13. 
261 Id. at 13. 
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affected landowners so that the true identities of their potentially 
harmful chemicals or the true extent of damage done is never 
revealed to the public.262 
Levine defines “opportunistic privacy” as “the dubious use of 
privacy law and principles as an information control tool.”263 
Although there are numerous examples of opportunistic privacy in 
this context, among the most important is the Pennsylvania 
fracking chemical disclosure law, which originally required 
doctors treating patients affected by these secret chemicals to sign 
confidentiality agreements in order to get access to that critical 
information.264 The policy behind this “physician gag rule” can 
only be interpreted as favoring trade secret protection over 
protection of public health. Moreover, the law basically required 
the doctors to choose between their freedom of speech or a 
violation of their Hippocratic oath when dealing with such patients. 
In a very positive development, however, that aspect of the law 
was recently struck down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as 
violative of the state’s constitution.265 
According to Levine, confidentiality creep and opportunistic 
privacy, when used in conjunction with trade secret protection “can 
provide or maintain the information dominance necessary for 
questions or concerns to remain unanswerable, even as the 
technology becomes increasingly adopted.”266 This is a poignant 
description of what is happening in the fracking industry: 
companies like Halliburton are using trade secret protection, in 
 
262 See, e.g. Efstathiou Jr. & Drajem, supra note 11; Ian Urbina, A Tainted Water Well, 
and Concern There May Be More, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/04/us/04natgas.html [https://perma.cc/JF4V-26VM]; 
Tr. of In-Chambers Proceeding, Hallowich v. Range Res. Corp., No. 2010–3954 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Aug. 23, 2011); Hearn v. BHP Billiton Petroleum (Ark.), Inc., No. 4:11-cv-
00474-JLH (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2013) (dismissal with prejudice upon out-of-court 
settlement). 
263 Levine, supra note 11, at 13. 
264 See 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3222.1(b)(10). 
265 See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 356, 569-–77 (Pa. 2016) (holding 
that the PA fracking disclosure law which required doctors to sign confidentiality 
agreements in order to treat patients violated the state’s constitution because it gave 
‘special treatment’ to the oil and gas industry and overly limited the rights of doctors to 
treat their patients). 
266 Levine, supra note 11, at 15 (internal citations omitted). 
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conjunction with confidentiality agreements, when environmental 
or public health damage is done. Moreover, when such harm does 
occur, captured regulators are willing to mostly discount the 
findings in complaints given to them. Overall, this has engendered 
a system where only Halliburton (or its peers) actually know the 
possible negative health effects of certain fracking fluids.267 Levine 
decries the fact that fracking companies’ improper use of these 
information control tools has prevented the public from even 
understanding what information it needs, wants, and why that is so, 
to the point that we are on a path to “losing public trust in facts 
themselves.”268 Furthermore, our current methods of handling 
information suppression are poorly adapted to the modern context 
in which it is happening; the companies have vested information 
interests, the law is too general, and most importantly, current “law 
makes no distinctions on whether or not certain information is in 
the public interest.”269 
III. FINDING A BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
PROPRIETARY PROTECTION 
A. Option #1: States Could Adopt a Similar Fracking Disclosure 
Law as Montana 
The new Montana law has numerous benefits. In Levine’s 
view, the law represents Montana’s “recognition that the public 
may have a greater interest in access to information than 
previously acknowledged by law or policy.”270 This recognition is 
embodied in the underlying purpose of the law, which is to balance 
common sense disclosures with justified, valid trade secret 
protections; therefore, the law has the benefit of generally being 
supported by both industry and environmental groups.271 
Moreover, it should also give the industry more assurances that 
their proprietary information is safe with the BOGC and prevent 
 
267 See id., at 27; Troutman et al., Public Herald Misconduct, supra note 12. 
268 Levine, supra note 11, at 15. 
269 Id. (emphasis added). 
270 Id. at 27. 
271 See Hall, supra note 230. 
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the need for further restrictive legislation on the public such as we 
saw in Pennsylvania, with the implementation of the “physician 
gag rule”. Furthermore, the law is quite strong on truly making 
fracking companies explain their trade secret designation. Under it, 
any questionable assertions of trade secrecy should theoretically 
fail. 
However, the Montana approach is not without its downsides 
as well. Chief among these is the problem of regulatory 
‘capture.’272 As documented in the Public Herald investigation in 
Pennsylvania where the oil and gas industry captured regulators 
and how it resulted in serious environmental degradation, the fact 
that the Montana law leaves determination of trade secret or 
proprietary status solely in the hands of state regulators is 
somewhat concerning.273 The law’s structure, while definitely an 
improvement over earlier disclosure regimes, is far from perfect 
and still leaves a good deal of room for exploitation. Furthermore, 
environmentalists have criticized the timing of the disclosure 
mandated by the law since it only requires a minimum of forty-
eight hours’ notice given to the state, which is not enough time for 
affected landowners to conduct necessary pre-drilling groundwater 
tests.274 As demonstrated by the Zimmermans and Leightons, such 
water tests are a necessary step towards having any viable claim 
against one of these fracking companies when one’s water is 
poisoned by the process.275 
Interestingly, one unexpected criticism that has sprouted since 
the law’s passage is that because it is so robust at protecting trade 
secrets, this actually makes fracking less safe for the 
environment.276 According to BOGC administrator Jim Halvorson, 
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drilling companies in Montana had warned the regulatory body 
that “in some cases non-trade secret chemicals are more harmful, 
but would be substituted to keep trade secrets under wraps.”277 Yet, 
this actually implicitly reveals the true weakness of the Montana 
solution: although it is strong at requiring a robust determination of 
trade secrecy, such a determination does not necessarily further 
public health. Moreover, the law is also very much reactionary 
rather than precautionary. Specifically, if an environmental 
calamity happened with these trade secret chemicals, as has 
happened elsewhere, the information necessary to rectify the 
damage would be safe with the BOGC, however, the damage 
would already be done. For these specific reasons, the Montana 
model is the less desirable of the two solutions proposed by this 
Note. 
B. Option #2: Incorporate the “Precautionary Principle” into the 
Definition of a Trade Secret 
The proposal by Professor Julie Zink to incorporate the so-
called “precautionary principle” into the definition of a trade secret 
under the DTSA is a robust idea that could solve many of the 
tensions that this paper seeks to address.278 Like the rules currently 
in effect in the European Union, the precautionary principle would 
simply shift the burden and require companies to demonstrate 
safety in return for trade secret protection rather than assuming that 
all trade secrets are safe without requiring any showing, as U.S. 
law currently does.279 The underlying policy rationale of this 
principle is essentially one of the main arguments that this Note 
has sought to make: the public has a right to know about 
information that impacts health and safety; therefore, it makes 
sense to require a pre-protection showing by the entity seeking 
trade secret status to first simply demonstrate that what they want 
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to protect is actually safe.280 If a product or process was deemed 
unsafe, it could never receive trade secret protection and the public 
would therefore be able to research and protect itself from possible 
use of that product or process.281 
There are numerous positive aspects of Zink’s approach. First, 
by adding the precautionary principle that forces companies to 
explain that their trade secret is safe before the damage is done, it 
implicitly prevents victims from having to request relief after the 
fact and theoretically prevents the damage from occurring in the 
first place.282 Moreover, assuming retroactive application, any 
currently unsafe but trade secret protected products or processes 
would actually be exposed for their dangers and, once that 
information was known, the dangers of the product could be 
studied. This would enhance overall public health. Finally, Zink’s 
approach is ideal because it would bring trade secret protection 
back in line with the concept’s original purpose—to promote 
commercial competition—rather than shielding the public from 
knowledge about potential public health dangers, which is how it is 
generally being used in the fracking context today. 
However, there are some drawbacks of Zink’s approach. The 
biggest of these is the fact that the DTSA does not pre-empt state 
law at this point;283 therefore, to have a truly meaningful impact, 
this re-definition of “trade secret” would need to happen under 
state laws and therefore the UTSA as well. Adding in “the 
information does not endanger public health” to the UTSA’s trade 
secret definition would not only better balance public health and 
proprietary protection but would also likely spur states to amend 
their own laws in line with the new model version of the UTSA. 
Another downside is the basic reality that Zink’s approach would 
be significantly costlier on regulated entities than the Montana 
approach. This cost would be born not only in the actual safety 
testing itself, but also expensive litigation determining what “safe” 
actually means. Finally, Zink’s approach may not completely fix 
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the fracking context since the use of confidentiality agreements has 
also been a huge issue preventing adequate knowledge about the 
impact of hydraulic fracturing on public health, however, it is a 
strong start to clarifying the definition of a trade secret. 
CONCLUSION: ADOPT ZINK’S APPROACH AT BOTH STATE AND 
FEDERAL LEVEL 
Looking macroscopically at the two proposed solutions, it 
becomes clear that Montana’s law better balances the competing 
needs of public disclosure and protecting truly valid trade secrets. 
However, Zink’s approach has a stronger stance on protecting 
public health. Yet because, at the end of the day, the protection of 
trade secret information could never justify the degradation of our 
public health, Zink’s approach is the better option, even if it 
ultimately would be significantly costlier on regulated entities. 
Theoretically, the large costs that are currently absorbed by the 
public for these unsafe trade secret abuses would simply be shifted 
back to the regulated entities who ushered them into effect. 
Because the largest downside of Zink’s proposal is simply that 
only amending the DTSA would not change state law, the proper 
solution is to simply to amend the UTSA and state law as well in a 
similar fashion, so that each incorporates the precautionary 
principle. Additionally, some future limits on companies’ abilities 
to use confidential agreements to silence folks who have been 
seriously harmed should be considered as well. However, those 
solutions are beyond the scope of this Note. 
The dubious use of privacy principles by Halliburton in 
particular, as documented above in this Note, would be rectified by 
Zink’s approach. Based on the limited results available, it seems 
that Halliburton has no incentive to use its eco-friendly fracking 
products, CleanSuite™ and CleanStim™, unless a customer is 
seeking to be environmentally-friendly.284 However, if the 
precautionary principle was incorporated into U.S. trade secret 
definitions, then neither Halliburton nor its peers would be able to 
utilize any harmful fracking solutions. Assuming that the literature 
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and sourcing claimed by Halliburton are accurate, however, a 
product like CleanStim™ should easily be found to be safe and 
thus deserving of trade secret protection, while other peer products 
which are not found safe would be banned and would lose trade 
secret status.285 Therefore, Halliburton would be able to reap the 
proprietary value from their valiant efforts to come up with a safe 
fracturing fluid while their peers would not get the same protection 
unless they created similarly safe fluids. Thus, this directly 
demonstrates not only how the precautionary principle protects the 
public from harm, but also implicitly incentivizes innovations that 
do the same thing. Alternatively, Congress could directly 
incentivize such innovation with a FIFRA-style disclosure law, 
although that is a more drastic solution.286 
Given that fracking is clearly going to be a large part of the 
U.S. domestic energy economy moving forward, it is important 
that we come up with the proper approach. Based on the dangers it 
poses, fracking must be done correctly if it is going to be done at 
all. Therefore, since it best balances the paramount concern of 
public health against the still-important practice of robustly 
protecting proprietary and trade secret information, Professor Julie 
Zink’s proposal to incorporate the precautionary principle into the 
definition of a trade secret under both federal and state law is the 
proper course of action. Hopefully members of the U.S. and state 
governments will follow suit and help make these important trade 
secret and fracking regulatory reform efforts a reality. 
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